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INTRODUCTION
A recent rise in Australia’s birth rate has
generated speculation that the nation’s pop-
ulation ageing ‘problem’ may have been
resolved. To understand why this is not so
it is necessary to understand the four tech-
nical dimensions of the phenomenon. They
are: numerical ageing (the absolute increase
in the numbers of elderly), structural age-
ing (the increasing proportion of the
population that is ‘old’), natural decline
(which occurs if/when deaths exceed births)
and absolute decline (which occurs if/when
migration is insufficient to replace the ‘lost’
births and increased deaths). These remark-
able trends, which are unfolding more or
less inexorably, are outlined in more detail
below—albeit succinctly, in order to pro-
vide a potted overview of the situation.
We begin by locating the trends in the
historical ‘moment’ in which they occur.
Once this broader context is understood it
is relatively easy to understand today’s
demography, and approximately how it
will unfold in the future. Demographers
refer to this context as ‘The Demographic
Transition’.
THE DEMOGRAPHIC
TRANSITION: ALSO IN A
NUTSHELL
The Demographic Transition refers to the
global shift from high to low birth and death
rates, and the one-off spurt in population
growth that accompanies the trends. Prior
to the transition, which began in the devel-
oped world in the mid-1700s, birth and
death rates were high; they essentially can-
celled each other out, resulting in zero or
very low levels of population growth
(ZPG). At the end of the transition, which
is presently occurring in the developed
world, birth and death rates are converg-
ing at low levels, and ZPG is again on the
horizon; many European countries are al-
ready experiencing ZPG.
But, during the transition, population
growth is explosive. This is because birth
and death rates do not commence decline
concurrently, nor at the same speed.  If
death rates—particularly infant and child
death rates—decline first, which is
precisely what happened in most developed
countries (and also in most developing
countries, where the transition began only
in the mid to late 1900s), more babies live,
and the population begins to grow. It also
becomes ‘younger’, because a greater
proportion of the population is young.
When these additional babies and children
become parents themselves, a few decades
later, death rates have typically fallen
further, and even more of their own children
survive. The result is a compounding of
population growth, driven not by rising
birth rates, but by declining infant and child
death rates.
It is this phenomenon, called transitional
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growth, which caused the doubling of the
world’s population in thirty years during the
second half of the 20th Century, and created
the subject matter for Paul Ehrlich’s famous
book, The Population Bomb.1 By contrast,
it is the subsequent shift to low birth rates
that is causing the world’s population to
become structurally ‘older’, because it is
causing the proportion of the population at
the younger ages to decrease—and
concomitantly, the proportion at the older
ages to increase.
Once a population contains more
elderly than children, it is a short step to it
experiencing more deaths than births,
despite the fact that life expectancy
continues to increase. An excess of deaths
over births results in natural decline, the
opposite of what has occurred for most of
modern history. This structural cross over—
the shift from natural increase to natural
decline—is already the experience of many
developed countries, and is expected to
begin in most developing countries
between the middle and end of the present
century. Such a situation is confidently
projected to cause the world’s population
to stop growing and in all likelihood begin
to decline in size, around the end of this
century.2
Natural decline is expected to begin in
Australia in the 2040s, even if net
international migration can be sustained at
around 110,000 per year.3 Seemingly
paradoxically, the driver of this shift is not
a decline in birth numbers,4 but rather, an
increase in the number of deaths that will
accompany the first dimension of the
phenomenon of population ageing:
numerical ageing.
NUMERICAL AGEING
Numerical ageing refers to the absolute
increase in the numbers of elderly. The in-
crease is primarily due to improvements in
life expectancy. During the early stages of
the demographic transition, the changes
drive a massive reduction in infant and child
mortality and dramatically increase the
probability of people surviving to old age.
Since the 1980s, particularly in the devel-
oped countries, equally significant gains
have been seen at the upper middle and
older ages.
The improvements of the past 80-odd
years are now beginning to show in a
sizeable increase in the numbers reaching
old age.  In the year 2000 a little over 2,000
Australians were aged 100 years and over;
today (in 2007) there are over 6,000.
Numerical ageing is also 100 per cent
guaranteed: those who will be 65+ in ten
years time are already 55+; we know how
many there are and the rate at which they
die (and migrate). Current birth rates will
have no effect on numerical ageing for 60–
70 years.
Reflecting this high degree of certainty
there is minimal difference in the projected
numbers of elderly between the Australian
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) high, medium
and low projection series. As Figure 1
shows, numerical ageing is also now
beginning to escalate. Currently there are
around 2.8 million Australians aged 65+
years. The annual increment is currently
73,000, but this will increase to 80,000 by
2009 and almost 140,000 by 2012—as the
Baby Boomers (in Australia, born 1946–
65) enter this age group, following which
it will remain above 130,000 for the
following two decades. The trend is
remarkably similar across Australia’s states,
territories and local government areas; all
that differs is its magnitude.
It is imperative that the steepness of the
numerical ageing climb on which we have
recently embarked, and the sustained nature
of its aftermath, be fully recognized. By
contrast with most European countries,
Australia’s numerical ageing will be both
lengthy and steep, reflecting the
disproportionate magnitude and length of
its baby boom (extending over 19 years).
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Surprising to many is that Australia was
one of only four countries to experience a
‘true’ baby boom, the three others being
New Zealand, Canada and the United
States.5 Most other developed countries
also experienced post war ‘spikes’, but all
were relatively brief—no more than five
or six years in length, and most involved
somewhat lower peak birth rates than
occurred in Australia and its three
counterpart countries. The correlate is a
more pronounced numerical ageing for
these countries.
The existence of rising numbers of
elderly is broadly recognised in the media
and, for example, throughout the
Intergenerational Report.6 However,
because no formal distinction is made
between the numerical and structural
dimensions, no distinction is made between
what is inevitable (numerical ageing) and
now occurring very rapidly, and what is
unfolding more slowly (structural ageing)
and is at least potentially amenable to
policy intervention.
STRUCTURAL AGEING
Structural ageing refers to the increase in
the proportion of the population that is eld-
erly. It is primarily caused by declining
birth rates which decrease the proportion
of the population that is young and there-
by increase the proportion that is old.
Structural ageing began occurring
across the developed world in the late
1800s, when birth rates first began to
decline, but it was interrupted for the period
of the baby boom. The additional babies
born during the boom caused the
population to grow younger during those
years; the declining fertility rates since have
caused it to grow older.
It is the fact that Australia’s fertility
rates were higher than those of its European
counterparts during the boom, remained
high for longer, and have not fallen as low
in the post-boom era, which primarily
explains why Australia’s population today
is somewhat ‘younger’ than its European
counterparts, not migration. Over the
longer term, migrants also grow old, adding
Source: ABS catalogue nos. 3101.0 and 3222.0
Figure 1: Numerical ageing Australia 1972–2021 (annual increment in numbers aged 65+ years
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to numerical ageing, and today tend to have
low fertility, thereby adding to structural
ageing at both ends of the equation.7
The extent to which structural ageing
will continue and deepen is thus primarily
dependent on what happens with the birth
rate. Demographers around the world agree
that it is unlikely that fertility will ever
return to its baby boom levels (in Australia
peaking at 3.6 births per woman in 1961).
The conditions that facilitated that boom
have changed fundamentally; it would take
profound social change to see today’s
women deliver an average of three births.
The result, as indicated in Figure 2, is that
while Australia’s population will grow by
some 2.25 million by 2016 and 4.3 million
by 2026, almost all of the growth will occur
at the older ages. Between now and 2026,
for example, numbers aged 65+ will
increase by 87 per cent while all other age
groups combined will increase by only 11
per cent. Suffice to say, the working age
population will experience similar trends.8
BRINGING THE TWO
DIMENSIONS TOGETHER
Numerical and structural ageing thus have
quite different causes—at least from a tech-
nical perspective. A population will not age
numerically if it has high death rates, nor
structurally if it has high birth rates.9 How-
ever, the two dimensions are, in reality,
experienced together. In 2007 Australia’s
baby boomers are aged 42–61 years. As
they move through the age structure they
will add to both the proportions and the
numbers of elderly (see Figure 3). The high
birth rates when they were born set in mo-
tion a particularly large population wave
(and initially caused the population to be-
come a little ‘younger’); improvements in
life expectancy since have greatly added
to the numbers that will reach old age. As
Figure 2: Projected per cent change in the Australian Population 2006–2016 and 2006–2026
Source: ABS 2005, Series B
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elsewhere, the Boomers are followed by
smaller cohorts (with the exception of the
large baby boom ‘echo cohort’ born around
1970), meaning that Australia’s profound
numerical ageing will be simultaneously
experienced as structural ageing.
NATURAL DECLINE
Together, numerical and structural ageing
usher in the third dimension of population
ageing. Once a population contains more
elderly than children it is a short step—
approximately a decade—to it having more
deaths than births, and to a situation of nat-
ural decline, the reverse of what we have
known for most of modern history.
A point of clarification is often needed
when this dimension is outlined: if life
expectancy is increasing, why is it that
deaths will increase? The answer is simply
a numbers game. Life expectancy has
indeed increased, and is still doing so, but
people cannot live forever—more elderly
eventually means more deaths.
As Figure 4 indicates, natural decline
is expected to occur in Australia before mid
century, but the shift will be driven by these
increased numbers of deaths (from
numerical ageing) rather than declining
numbers of births. Notably this crossover
occurs even with annual net migration
gains of 110,000, which many people
erroneously believe still add a
disproportionate number of births to the
population (as they did during the post-war
era). As noted above, today’s migrants—
especially skilled/long-term migrants, who
now comprise two-thirds of Australia’s
permanent and long-term migrants—tend
to scarcely replace themselves.
Relatedly, but somewhat perversely,
natural decline will occur much earlier in
the nation’s older states, South Australia
and Tasmania, which tend to lose their
reproductive age populations via
migration, and thus also the babies and
children those people would have had, or
have had but taken with them. Notably,
natural decline is already extant in 7 per
cent of Australia’s local government
areas10, much of it similarly migration-
driven.11
Figure 3: Age–sex structure of the Australian population 1976, 1996 and 2016>
Source: 1976, 1996: ABS Census of Population and Dwellings; 2016: ABS (2005) Catalogue 3222.0, medium
variant, Series B
Notes: Shaded area = baby boomers, born 1946–65
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By contrast, conventional natural
decline—that driven by low fertility per
se—is already extant across the European
continent, as well as in Japan, primarily as
the result of those countries’ excessively
low birth rates. Astoundingly the shift is
anticipated to occur in populous China
before Australia—the result of China’s One
Child Policy.
ABSOLUTE DECLINE
Where there is insufficient migration to re-
place the ‘lost’ births and increased deaths,
as is expected in structurally old South
Australia and Tasmania within a few dec-
ades, we can expect those populations to
enter absolute decline. At a national level
this profound shift is not projected to be-
gin before the end of present century,
although this depends on annual net inter-
national migration remaining around
110,000, and the birth rate remaining
around 1.7. While the latter may be achiev-
able (and indeed Australia’s birth rate has
recently seen a small increase), internation-
al competition for migrants—particularly
skilled migrants—is increasing, with those
countries which previously sent migrants
to Australia (that is, much of Europe) them-
selves now seeking migrants and
competing with Australia for them. Cur-
rently, the potential supply of prospective
migrants seems bottomless, with countries
such as India expected to grow to some 1.5
billion by mid-century. However it is worth
noting that a net gain of 110,000 is typical-
ly achieved in Australia via an intake of
410,000 offsetting an outflow of 300,000.
The extent to which Australia’s emigrants
and immigrants are exact replacements for
each other is questionable, and will almost
certainly become a political issue as struc-
tural ageing unfolds. From the point at
which natural decline is encountered,
growth can only come from migration, and
those migrants will necessarily come from
different cultural and ideological origins
than previously.
We can again look to our counterpart
countries for evidence that absolute decline
Figure 4: Births and deaths Australia 1901–2051
Source: ABS catalogue nos. 3101.0 and 3222.0 (2005), Series B
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is something we will almost certainly have
to contend with. The phenomenon has
already begun in Eastern Europe, Germany
and Japan, and is at Italy’s door. As
indicated earlier, absolute population
decline is also expected to begin at a global
level during the 22nd Century. The fact
that this coincides with its relatively late
onset in Australia is a reflection of the
latter’s expectation of a continuing high per
capita ratio of migrants to its ‘stock’
population, and a relatively high
(historically speaking) birth rate. Currently
the two dynamics12 see Australia’s
population growing at a rate a little above
the global average (1.3 per cent per year
compared with 1.2 per cent), and well
above that for other developed countries
(0.2 per cent per year). But the extent to
which Australia’s disproportionate share of
the migrant pool is likely to continue
uncontested is debatable.
PREMATURE AGEING
Further clarification of one issue referred
to above—migration-driven population
ageing—is important. A population can age
for any or all of four reasons: low fertility,
increased life expectancy, migration-driv-
en gains at the older ages, and
migration-driven losses at the younger ages.
Because the latter tends to pertain to the
reproductive age population, there is a dou-
ble impact because of the loss of the
children those people have taken with them
and/or would have had. The trend has been
termed ‘premature ageing’.13 If compound-
ed by migration gains at older ages,
structural ageing is even more accelerated.
It is this form of ageing that is the
primary reason for Tasmania’s status as
Australia’s oldest region (as indicated by
the median age).14 During the 1990s the
state experienced a profound loss of people
in the 18–38 year age group, and smaller
Figure 5: Age–Sex Structure Tasmania 1991 and 2006
Source: ABS Estimated Resident Population 1991 and 2006
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but equally significant gains at older ages.
Although Tasmania’s net migration has
been positive since 2002, the ‘bite’ in the
age structure as a result of the age-
specificity of its migrants remains profound
(see Figure 5)—and will continue to have
an impact on the state’s demography for
decades to come. In fact Tasmania’s birth
rate has recently risen and is presently close
to replacement level (2.1); it is also the
second highest in the country, falling just
below that of the Northern Territory. Thus
Tasmania’s birth rate is relatively high, but
its migration-depleted numbers at the peak
childbearing ages have their sequel in
relatively low birth numbers. Notably
almost half of Australia’s local government
areas have similarly prematurely ageing
age structures.15
By contrast, Australia’s other ‘elder’
state, South Australia, is ‘old’ primarily
because of its historically lower birth rate
(currently 1.8). That state has also
experienced significant net migration
losses at the younger ages, but not to the
same extent as has Tasmania (see Figure
6). As a result of these different drivers,
South Australia has greater proportion aged
65+ years than does Tasmania (in 2006,
15.1 compared with 14.6 per cent) even
though the two states now have virtually
identical median ages (38.7 and 38.8 years
respectively).16
IN SUM
Understanding both the four dimensions
of population ageing, and its local ‘driv-
ers’, is critical for planning: a population
that is ageing structurally because of the
out-migration of its young will have sig-
nificantly different labour market
implications, resource needs and demo-
graphic consequences (such as a potentially
more rapid shift to natural and absolute
Figure 6: Age–Sex Structure South Australia 1991 and 2006
Source: ABS Estimated Resident Population 1991 and 2006
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